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Grounded in governance of security theory, this article seeks to provide a structural 
and operational analysis of policing beyond the police in Northern Ireland.  While the 
polity enjoys relatively low levels of ‘officially’ recorded crime as part of its post-
conflict status, little empirical analysis exists as to the epistemological roots of 
security production outside that of the Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI).  
The article aims to establish that beyond more prominent security analyses related to 
paramilitary ‘policing’, the country is in fact replete with a substantial reservoir of 
legitimate civil society policing which contributes to policing, community safety and 
quality of life issues.  While such non-state policing at the level of locale was 
recognised by the Independent Commission for Policing (ICP), structured 
understandings have rarely permeated governmental or academic discourse beyond 
anecdotal contentions.  Thus, the article provides an empirical assessment of the 
complex, non-state policing landscape beyond the formal state apparatus; examines 
definitions and rationalities for such community-based security governance; and 
explores issues related to co-opting such non-state security ‘otherness’ into more 
formal relations with the state.  
 




Shadow Policing: Security Governance and the  
Parameters of Safety in Northern Ireland 
 
Introduction 
Almost without exception, dominant narratives of policing, safety and security 
associated with Northern Ireland’s recent transformations have centred on the 
progress towards ‘normal’ policing by the Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI) 
(Ellison 2007; Topping 2008a).  With changes to the formal state policing apparatus 
having acted as ‘meta bargaining’ as part of the transition from conflict to peace, it 
may be contended that structural re-alignments to policing started under the 
Independent Commission for Policing in Northern Ireland (ICP 1999) have by-in-
large, been completed (Campbell et al. 2003; Topping 2008b).  Indeed, the ICP was 
set up as part of the 1998 Belfast Agreement political negotiations in the country, with 
a mandate to resolve the issue of policing which for many, lay at the very heart of the 
conflict (O’Rawe 2003).  
Undoubtedly, current evidence highlights contention as to the success (or 
otherwise) of PSNI’s ability to deliver community policing (or Policing with the 
Community under the rubric of the ICP) as central to its more ‘normalised’ service 
(CJINI 2012); notwithstanding the persistence of a severe dissident terrorist threat, the 
potential for civil disorder, and legacy issues (Byrne and Monaghan 2008; Ellison and 
O’Rawe 2010; Frampton 2011; Lundy 2011; McDonald, 2012; Topping and Byrne 
2012a).  But for the majority of the population, the imperative of fully inclusive, 
shared police governance between former Loyalist and Republican protagonists has 
been realised through policing ‘having been given back to the people’ – notably 
through some of the most robust policing oversight and accountability structures 
anywhere in the world (Bayley 2008; Mulcahy 2006; Office of the Oversight 
Commissioner 2007). 
 However, the intention here is not to recount nor assess the parameters of 
policing in Northern Ireland through the lens of police-organisational change; nor 
consider policing from the perspective of well rehearsed debates surrounding 
summary, paramilitary ‘justice’ as a form of social control during the conflict (Knox 
2002; Hayes and McAllister 2005).  Rather, this paper seeks to define safety and 
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security through the existence of what the authors term ‘shadow policing’ – as a 
distinct form of latent, non-state and networked form of security governance across 
the country which contributes to the post-conflict peace and the relatively safe nature 
of the polity (Brogden, 2000).  This may also be viewed as an alternative narrative to 
that of exclusive police ‘ownership’ of Northern Ireland’s ‘criminological 
netherworld’, epitomised through its position as Europe’s low crime comparator in 
spite of the recent history of protracted, internal armed conflict  (Ellison and Mulcahy 
2001; Van Dyk et al. 1990; Lyness et al. 2004; PSNI 2012).  And importantly, 
beyond the ‘official’ criminological picture, it is contended that a significant gap in 
academic or policy debate has been a sufficient interrogation of the dynamics 
underpinning this production of policing, with the presumption of causal security 
relations having remained firmly with the police (Topping and Byrne 2012a). 
 Grounded in governance of security theory, the remainder of the paper seeks 
to frame and analyse policing (in its broadest sense) outside that of the state (Shearing 
and Wood 2003; Martin 2012).  From the outset, it is important to note the paper 
deliberately excludes both policing associated violent, extra-juridical ‘justice’ by 
paramilitary actors; along with modes of activity grounded in more formal state 
origins, such as neighbourhood watch (Loader and Walker 2001; Topping, 2013).   
Thus, as part of reconnecting ‘alternative’ sources of policing to the etiology of 
security production (O’Mahony et al. 2000; McEvoy et al. 2002), such non-state 
security governance may be imagined as encompassing  
‘any institutional, organisational, communal or individual agents or 
nodes…that are interconnected in order to authorise and/or provide security to 
the benefit of internal or external stakeholders’ (Dupont 2004:78). 
 
The paper will further seek to analyse that which constitutes non-state security 
governance, or ‘shadow policing’ in Northern Ireland; while defining the delivery of 
policing and security from the perspective of those actors and organisations.  And 
finally, the paper will also propose avenues for cooperation between such actors and 
the PSNI as part of acknowledging the reality of ‘shadow policing’ which exists – as a 
hybrid of what Topping (2008b) has termed ‘community governance policing’.  
Indeed, the imperative of this approach has been captured by Baker (2002:31) who 
notes that policing and security are not shaped entirely by national public agendas, but 
by consumers, or the public.  And where non-state actors and agencies bypass the 
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The empirical data for this paper draws upon extensive qualitative evidence spanning 
the period from 2007-2012 concerned with the delivery of non-state policing in 
Northern Ireland. With kind permission, the majority of the data is drawn from 
interviews and case studies carried out by the authors as part of a research study for 
the Belfast Conflict Resolution Consortium (BCRC) in 2011 to examine a decade of 
community safety policy and practice in Northern Ireland (XXXX).  The BCRC is 
part of the PEACE III Programme under the Special EU Programmes Body and 
provides citywide, cross-community partnership working between representative 
Loyalist and Republican organisations to assist conflict transformation across 
Belfast’s interfaces and divided communities.  As part of the longitudinal approach, 
this BCRC research is further supplemented through drawing upon complimentary 
policing research by one of the authors (XXXX).   
In this regard, the paper is based on a total of thirty-six semi-structured 
interviews with representatives and organisations across Loyalist and Republican 
communities (mainly) in the Greater Belfast area; along with four case studies of 
community-based organisations who deliver either conflict management programmes 
or policing interventions at a local level.  Of the interviews, sixteen were drawn from 
both from Loyalist and Republican areas, with four interviews derived from 
organisations representing neutral or ‘cross-community’ affiliations. Looking to the 
four case studies, they comprise data which detailed the the activities of: a 
Loyalist/Unionist community support programme for former paramilitary members; a 
Republican/Nationalist community safety forum working outside formal state 
community safety parameters; a cross-community partnership dealing with issues 
related to interface violence and tensions; and a summer intervention scheme to 
provide diversions for young people from the criminal justice system. 
Thus, the present study draws uniquely upon the activity of those auspices 
directly involved in security governance in the country – as the first empirical 
interrogation of non-state policing provision in beyond more generic contentions 
(Office of the Oversight Commissioner 2007; Kempa and Shearing 2002).  However, 
 6 
for the purpose of the current analysis, the authors concentrate solely upon the nature 
of non-state policing from the perspective of the auspices and providers themselves, 
rather than considering views from a police or statutory standpoint.  Furthermore, the 
intention of the paper is not to provide a comparative analysis of non-state policing 
between Loyalist and Republican communities.  Rather, the present research aims to 
capture the nature of those policing contributions as part of a baseline assessment of 
such activity. 
 While the extent of research ‘generalisability’ across the country may limited 
(Mason 1996), the literature points more generally to the fact that policing issues 
within the Loyalist and Republican sample areas have a resonance with the wider 
communities they represent, although broadly restricted ‘to urban rather than the more 
rural and isolated areas of the country, often sheltered from the more damaging 
effects of the conflict’ (Topping 2008b:780).  And beyond traditionally polemic 
Loyalist/Unionist and Nationalist/Republican comparisons, the current research is 
about providing a more nuanced interpretation of the diverging interests and 
rationalities which underpin non-state security governance activity in comparison 
with policing as delivered by PSNI; and locate this within the context of their 
existence (Loader and Walker 2001). 
As the authors would further argue, part of the current empirical gap in such 
understanding lies with the sheer lack of governmental, policy or academic research 
space afforded to capturing non-state policing provision in the country.  In reference 
to the former, this has been ‘reflective of a mindset which fears genuine community 
involvement and ownership in the process of justice’ (McEvoy et al. 2002:197) – 
especially where many of those involved in local security arrangements are 
themselves former combatants or protagonists in the conflict (Shirlow et al. 2005; 
Shirlow and Murtagh 2006; Dwyer 2012).  Yet on a more pragmatic level, such 
limited knowledge is due to the fact there has simply been no systematic ‘mapping’ of 
existing auspices and providers of security in Northern Ireland; nor an assessment of 
their governing sensibilities and practices and the issues this poses for policing 
arrangements (Wood 2004).  The current methodological approach therefore aims to 
provide a ‘grand tour’ of this issue, with the explicit intention to open up 
understandings, rather than definitively capture, the fact that PSNI are not the only 
auspice capable of providing a viable ‘security good’ in the country (Grabosky 1992; 
Loader and Walker 2006; Shearing 2006; Undheim 2003). 
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The context of non-state policing in Northern Ireland 
 
One of the key issues to consider as part of beginning to imagine non-state security 
governance in Northern Ireland is with the conceptual policing framework.  It is 
important to note that security, nor its governance, is a neutral concept as part of the 
socio-political landscape which has underpinned policing over the past thirty years in 
the country (O’Rawe 2003).  While the paper does not seek to recount the historical 
antecedents of (necessary) police reform in the country, the state police – and by 
extension security – have been symbolic of the normative ordering of Northern 
Ireland’s (still) divided society (Ellison 2007; Ellison and Martin 2000; Mulcahy 
2006; Shirlow and Murtagh 2006).  To this extent, policing remains inextricably 
linked to wider debates about the processes of ensuring security is governed ‘in ways 
that promote ‘public goods’ in accordance with ‘public interests’ (Shearing and Wood 
2003:205). 
 Examing the reforms to policing under the ICP, on the one hand they created a 
police-organisational change process, described as one of the most complex blueprints 
for police reform anywhere in the world (OOC 2006).  And in relation to the  
‘public good’ of policing in the country, such reforms were part of ‘an end to 
the incremental and politically nuanced ‘tinkering’ to policing, and the 
beginning of a substantive, inclusive and permanently acceptable change 
process…’ (Topping 2008a:377-8).   
 
Yet on the other hand, the effect of the necessary ICP reforms, in spite of Shearing’s 
more radical vision, was to entrench the Western democratic tradition of clinging 
‘tenaciously to the belief that the contemporary array of policing institutions is the 
only one capable…’ (Burris 2004 cited in Shearing 2006:13).  In this respect, the 
organisational and structural changes associated with the ICP’s first ‘stream’ of 
physical reforms trumped over the more radical, second ‘stream’ related to the 
governance of security – described by O’Mahony et al. (2000) as part of a ‘missed 
chance’ to embrace alternative community security capacities (Topping 2008a; 
2008b). 
Further police-organisational limitations to wider policing considerations in 
the post-ICP era may be observed through the reduction of the ICP’s broader policing 
language to that of technocratic, operational definitions of police activity (Belfast 
Telegraph 2012; Brunger 2011).  With significant socio-political capital generated 
from PSNI’s position as one of the most accountable, overseen police services 
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anywhere in the world such police-centric, bureaucratic inertia has become the 
definition of policing delivery itself (Bayley 2008; Ellison 2007).  Thus, chances to 
conceive policing in language other than that set by the policing institutions have 
remained limited – especially where non-traditional policing discourse challenges the 
orthodoxy of PSNI’s organisational ‘expertise’ on crime control (Johnston and 
Shearing 2003; Topping and Byrne 2012a).  However, beyond such general issues of 
police-organisational centrism, within the context of how security is governed there 
exists a specific meaning in terms of policing delivery as a power relation in the 
country. 
 Indeed, the combination of political symbolism to the reform process; the 
retention of one of the highest police-to-population ratios in the Western world; and 
the lowest crime figures in 14 year, have all cemented PSNI’s operational prowess in 
policing and security matters (Topping and Byrne 2012b).  The issue for PSNI has 
therefore been their inability to officially ‘accept’ that modes of policing other than 
their own have contributed to, or are a necessary part of, the security status quo – at 
least in the public eye.  And while community policing has been PSNI’s dominant 
narrative as part of policing with communities across the country, engagement with 
security ‘others’ as part of this power dynamic, remains taboo (Dupont 2004). 
 To some extent, it is possible to observe the rationale for PSNI resisting what 
may be viewed as challenging or competing loci of power – especially when set 
against the destablising potential of challenges to PSNI authority and all they 
represent.  Yet on the other hand, it has been well documented that non-state, 
community-based security provision continues to be a significant ‘player’ as part of 
the wider spectrum of policing in the country (Jarman 2002; 2006; OOC 2007; 
Topping 2008b; Topping and Byrne 2012a). 
 The present argument is therefore about moving past such transitional politics 
of police change, contest and ownership characteristic of the post-ICP era; and to 
consider ‘a radically different conception of social order in which consideration is 
given to the conditions under which groups are prepared to cooperate…’ (Crawford 
1995:122).  This is especially pressing when auspices of non-state security 
governance in Northern Ireland still tend ‘to be judged illegitimate in terms of the 
very Westphalian ideal that they are moving beyond’ (Kempa and Shearing 2002:30). 
 As part of contextualising non-state security governance in the country, to 
some extent broad sociological explanations have been set forth to consider, for 
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example, the country’s resilience to crime in comparison with other post-conflict 
societies (Altebeker 2005).  Through a Durkheimian school of ‘solidarity in conflict’, 
detailed accounts of close-knit communities, vibrant civil society and ‘grapevine’ 
community networks have all been used to explicate (mainly) urban, working-class 
Loyalist and Republic community resistance to the vagaries of crime – 
notwithstanding the actual and potential deterrent effects of brutal paramilitary ‘back 
alley justice’ meted out at local levels (Shaw and Shearing 1998; Brewer 2001; 
Brogden 2000; Morrisey and Pease 1982; Monaghan 2004; NICVA 2005; Topping 
and Byrne 2012b).  Furthermore, significant alienation of (mainly) 
Republican/Nationalist communities from engagement with the formal state police 
throughout the conflict and post-conflict phases of recent history add weight to the 
fact dynamics beyond state police intervention mediate the country’s criminological 
narrative (Byrne and Monaghan 2008; Ryder 1997; Ellison and Mulchay 2001; 
Ellison 2000). 
 Though more significantly, and for the purposes of the present argument, as 
noted by one of the former ICP commissioners, Clifford Shearing, what belies this 
rather amorphous picture of security production are:  
‘networks of policing nodes – as agencies, groups and collectives…outside the 
public sector that directly participate in the process of policing…[as] a fact of 
life’ (Shearing 2000:388).   
 
Indeed, a key aim of this paper is to take forward the thinking of the body set up to 
oversee the implementation of the ICP recommendations, the Office of the Oversight 
Commissioner (OOC), who stated in their final report that the country’s policing 
institutions should be alert to the contributions of well-intentioned, non-violent 
community and voluntary organisations and individuals (Kempa and Shearing 2002; 




Defining shadow policing 
 
In an attempt to define the reality of that which comprises ‘shadow policing’ in 
Northern Ireland, an initial point of reference lies with the perspective taken on 
governance of security itself.  Martin (2012) argues that an overly simplistic analysis 
of police-organisational diversification within Western policing traditions has 
dominated thought, whereby the ‘solid state’ technologies of the public police are 
gradually giving way to more malleable forms of security as part of society’s growing 
security needs (Garland 2001; Hughes 2007; Zedner 2009). 
 In view of the unique post-conflict environment from which such security 
‘otherness’ has emerged in the country, is therefore important to extricate analysis 
from the ‘trap’ of resource/demand comparisons. Indeed, from the research non-state 
policing capacities in the country are comprised of: 
‘a very diverse group of people…some very politically motivated groups, 
some very socially motivated groups – it’s a complete mixed bag.  And their 
level of engagement with the police will vary quite widely’ (community 
respondent). 
 
Though by the same token, it is important from the outset not to develop overly ‘cosy’ 
or ‘wholesome’ conceptions about the capacity and ability of non-state actors to 
deliver policing and security within any constitutive or fundamental sense of the term 
– not least because it would be naïve to assume otherwise because of the country’s 
(paramilitary) history of ‘dark social capital’ (Lea 2002; Loader and Walker 2006; 
Putzel 1997; Zedner 2009).  However, to simply ‘recode’ the delivery of security as 
acceptable or unacceptable (Rose 1996) – either set against neoliberal police 
‘standards’ or political viability – belies the complexity of security governance as 
conceived and delivered in Northern Ireland (Johnston and Shearing 2003).  Indeed, 
the post-conflict focus upon PSNI alone has created a ‘security fallacy’ whereby ‘the 
public believe that the government possess the ability to control the crime rate and 
that a failure to do so represents a lack of service delivery’ (Leggett 2003 cited in 
Marks and Goldsmith 2006:157).  In this regard, it was an apt comment by a 
community-based respondent that: 
‘We’re no alternative to the PSNI.  What we are is a response to a lack of 
policing in our own areas.  So we aren’t out trying to be the ‘[named area] 
cops’.  It isn’t like that at all.  There was stuff [crime] going on, it wasn’t 
being policed, and it needed to be policed.  So we developed a community 
response to that’.   
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At this point, the authors argue that the policing landscape in the country should 
therefore be viewed as a collection of ‘territories’ of ‘security administration’.  Thus, 
it allows for the rejection of any one particular perspective on the delivery of policing 
and accepting, in a Foucauldian sense, that the power for policing comes from 
everywhere – the harnessing of which has the potential to deepen the democratic, 
common ‘good’ security (Shearing 2006).  This may be observed in regard to one 
respondent whereby: 
‘there’s so many different permutations and calculations, it really is a 
minefield at times who you’re dealing with and where they sit.  But in all 
honesty, they’re all going towards the same objective at the end of the day – 
they all want a better place and a safer place for all the community to live in’ 
 
 Though beyond the conceptual, the contextual circumstances out of which 
non-state security governance has emerged are equally important in helping to supply 
a definition of ‘shadow policing’.  Here, security governance at a local level may be 
imagined as a ‘point’ on a wider spectrum of civil society organising in the country – 
or its civic ‘hyper-organisation’ (Bayley 2008).  Indeed, such civil society energy 
across a range of domains including health, education, politics, advocacy and human 
rights ‘has been inextricably linked with, and interconnected with, the political 
situation’ (Acheson et al. 2004:41) – related to wider societal coping mechanisms for 
the pressures of internecine, armed conflict and sectarian division over nearly four 
decades.   
More specifically, and developing out of what may be termed a policing and 
security ‘vacuum’, the historical separation of mainly working-class Republican and 
Nationalist communities from state police intervention has generated a sense of 
‘security liminality’ in which the normal processes of Peelian policing simply do not 
work (Byrne and Monaghan 2008; Mulcahy 2006).  Thus, it is within this liminal 
‘space’ in which a variety of actors beyond the state have existed (and continue to 
exist) as part of the complex policing landscape. And somewhere in between, it is 
Morrow (2006:73) who succinctly states that:  
‘where the state could not provide protection, which was the starting point for 
many Catholics and Nationalists and could easily emerge for less well 
protected working class Protestant communities…there was an enormous 
reservoir of understanding for extra state [policing]’. 
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 Therefore, it is this state security and policing liminality combined with 
(locally) viable and willing actors to fill policing requirements which is of interest.  
Because where such activity occurs, by default it falls outside standard legal, 
procedural and regulatory rules to which state organisations are subject, creating 
alternative rules of operation, informed by the local circumstance and distance from 
the state police (Johnston and Shearing 2003).  
It may be argued that non-state security governance in Northern Ireland is not 
therefore concerned solely with ‘safety’ in a police-centric sense, but acquires a 
community meaning in terms of providing a sense of belonging, cooperation and 
social support as an attribute of the (conflict-related) circumstances in which auspices 
of policing are embedded (Coleman 1994).  Thus, ‘shadow policing’ may be defined 
through its representation of a symbolic order in addition to an empirical policing 
reality (Delanty 2003:46).  This was highlighted through the assertion of one 
community organisation that claimed: 
‘the vast majority of community groups – 95%, are able to collaborate 
together…enable them to reign in their own ambitions about something and 
say ‘so and so does that type of thing better than we do, so they should be the 
ones [with primacy].  So we [as a network of community groups] have that 
understanding’. 
 
Such an assertion in relation to socially-informed rules of operation have been 
supported through research by the Criminal Justice Inspection for Northern Ireland 
(CJINI) who, in attempting to examine the contributions of the community/voluntary 
sector to the criminal justice system, have accepted that:  
‘in broad terms the voluntary and community sector was seen as the most 
appropriate for social inclusion and support work, including crime prevention, 
while the state sector was seen as fulfilling legal compliance and enforcement 
responsibilities (CJINI 2006:13). 
 
But as a note of caution, much of this activity is based upon sectarian lines, clearly 
not conducive to an overarching public security ‘good’ for the country (Shirlow and 
Murtagh 2006). 
 In taking a step back from attempts to define ‘shadow policing’, precisely the 
problem for wider societal and indeed, state acceptance, of non-state policing 
contributions has been the politics of police reform, as noted above.  With the primary 
focus of policing in Northern Ireland having been shaped by the imperatives of 
institutional-political reform over the past 15 years, this has effectively distracted 
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attention from the unique defining contexts which generated non-state policing in the 
first place (Rose 1996).  Indeed, this police-institutional centrism has remained 
wedded to the assumption that to ‘fix’ the police as an organisation is to deal with the 
wider problems of policing in Northern Ireland – themselves grounded in over 30 
years of conflict.  This has resulted in the de facto marginalisation of those groups and 
organisations on both sides who wish to participate in, or pose a challenge to, the 
centrality of policing by PSNI.  As one interviewee stated: 
‘there are all these organisations, and you can call them what you like, but 
there is a reluctance…there is a reluctance to let go of some control.  And I 
don’t mean you hand over policing [to community groups] wholesale, but to 
work more with, and give more to community groups and organisations which 
are already in existence’ (community respondent). 
 
Thus, in returning to the concept of ‘recoding’, the definition of ‘shadow 
policing’ is currently that of a marginal, competing or illegitimate activity.  On the 
one hand, it can be argued that such policing contributions have helped to create a 
more stable societal landscape in which the police-organisational reform process has 
been able to flourish.  Yet on the other hand, ‘shadow policing’ by virtue of its unique 
operational circumstances, does not easily fall under ‘normal’ definitions of policing, 
the consequence of which has been for such activity in both Loyalist and Republican 
communities to be simply ‘affiliated to some kind of anti-community whose morality, 
lifestyle or comportment is considered a threat…’ (Rose 1996:340).  
 
Delivering shadow policing 
 
In moving away from definitional issues associated with non-state security 
governance, it is important to consider ‘shadow policing’ in terms of the dynamics of 
its delivery.  The authors would argue on the basis of the evidence, understandings of 
the diverse ways in which policing and security are exercised in the country have 
been unduly tied to either the explicit crime reduction strategies of the PSNI; or the 
maintenance of social control by paramilitary actors (Rose and Miller 1992; Feenan 
2002). Therefore, the focus of this section shall be to move beyond the association 
between police work and ontological community understandings of security, to 
consider the delivery of ‘shadow policing’ with reference to the etiology of security 
production (Loader and Walker 2001). 
 A key reference point in terms of the delivery of ‘shadow policing’ is with the 
networked structure of these auspices and providers of security (Martin 2012).  
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Across both Loyalist and Republican communities, the variety of groups and bodies 
in existence to promote local policing do so in a way which is neither explicitly 
ordered, nor randomly conceived.  This structure was most succinctly described by 
one Loyalist grouping, detailing that: 
‘what you have in this areas is very good [community] structure which has lots 
of things underneath it…they would be a good central hub there…[name] will 
complement the bits that everyone else is doing, filling the gaps, or developing 
new areas of working which no one else has the time or resources to do’.  
 
Beyond organisational rules and hierarchies, such networks in fact use ‘relationships 
to influence behavior and change minds…are more flexible, less hierarchical and 
therefore more responsive to…shifts in the environment’ (Gilchrist 2004:34).  With 
the basis for membership of a network generally derived from ‘interest’ rather than 
strictly geography (except across sectarian divides), it is precisely this fluid, 
amorphous dynamic which allows non-state policing in the country delivery to have 
access into, and comprise of, virtually all latent community capacities and spheres of 
life – and to manage the complexity of potential relations.  This was noted by a 
community representative insofar as: 
‘in [area] all those dots in that map behind you [points to wall chart with 250 
community organisations], I will probably know somebody in every one of 
those organisations, and there might be ten others [groups] in [area] who 
will…’ 
 
As the basis for a unique form informal intelligence-led policing, such arrangements 
allow each of the nodes or auspices to develop: 
‘a detailed local knowledge of places and spaces…rely to a great extent on 
their personal knowledge of and relationships with local residents, young 
people and of local groups, and they have the ability to act effectively because 
they each have a degree of local authority’ (Jarman 2006:35). 
 
 Further considering delivery of ‘shadow policing’ as informal policing 
through knowledge-led approaches, the mediating impact of local communities for 
social order may also be observed (Foster 1995).  With the delivery of non-state 
policing grounded in local context and need rather than structural, organisational 
outputs associated with PSNI for example, the delivery of ‘shadow policing’ is thus 
part of a broader policing philosophy whereby: 
‘it makes no sense at all to treat an offender as if he had no family, never went 
to school or work, never visited the shops…if you ignore the fact the boy who 
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broke the window lives in the next street, that his dad drinks in the local 
pub…who else…can participate in mending…the problems crime has created’ 
(Alternatives 2000 cited in McEvoy et al. 2002:201). 
 
This point was clearly made by a Republican-based organisation involved more 
holistic approaches to policing and quality of life insofar as: 
‘we have crèche facilities, after school clubs, young peoples’ groups on a 
range of issues…young men’s and women’s groups…so we’ve a finger on the 
pulse of every aspect of community life.  Many people would say this centre is 
the heartbeat of the community’. 
 
However, in terms of generic notions of the ‘public good’ of security, it is important 
not to conceive the delivery such activity as part of any grand ‘project’ to render 
alternative policing solutions to entire populations or communities.  Rather, the 
importance of its delivery lies with its tailored, networked ability to mediate the nexus 
between local security needs and capacities – the aggregation of which across the 
multitude of actors and organisations across the country has implications for PSNI in 
terms of their resourcing; and for populations less affected by crime (Shearing and 
Wood 2003).  Thus, to consider the delivery of ‘shadow policing’ without reference to 
the nature of its existence or potential wider impact fails to consider the innovative 
nature of such capacities; assumes the delivery of such policing activity is a purely 
self-serving process; and that state policing provision is but optional as opposed to 
lacking in such communities where non-state policing exists (Perry et al. 1976). 
 From a state perspective, to acknowledge the authority and capacity of non-
state policing is also to ‘accept’ some aspect of authoritative transfer to what may be 
conceived as barely accountable auspices of security by PSNI (Loader 2000).  In 
addition, the deep-rooted social, economic and sectarian issues which for so long have 
remained hidden under the veil of the conflict arguably need to be underpinned by 
greater – not less – state intervention and support.   
But in terms of the foundational security effected through the delivery of 
‘shadow policing’ in mainly working class Loyalist and Republican communities, it is 
itself predicated upon organised communities, trust, social capital, shared values and 
relatively low levels of crime.  As recounted by one respondent: 
‘everybody knows everybody.  Nothing can happen without someone else 
knowing.  And we have workers like [name] who could tell you the name of 
every young person in [area] – so it’s impossible for anyone to do anything 
without someone knowing’. 
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Interestingly, such embedded, networked community qualities would appear to 
mitigate factors deemed fatal to the necessary community organising and capacities 
(such as deprivation and sectarianism) as part of governing their own security affairs 
(Jones 2007; Matsueda 2006: Nolan et al. 2004).  Here, the absence of disorder and 
community breakdown may be a more useful metric of delivery as opposed to the 
presence of procedural police metrics which for so long has underpinned state-based 
thinking on security in the country. 
 But in terms of ‘shadow policing’, one outstanding issues which merit 
attention is motivation for delivery.  Related more closely to Republican/Nationalist 
communities because of the traditional dissociations with state policing apparatus 
(Mulcahy 2006), the genesis for such activity in the first place derived from the 
political goals of ‘resisting’ the state; together with police inability to deliver ‘normal’ 
policing set within the counter-terrorism context (Hamilton et al. 1995).  However, in 
the post-ICP era of fully inclusive political support for the PSNI, a question seldom 
asked relates to the extent to which the delivery of ‘shadow policing’ remains an 
incentive to continue with limited contact and engagement between communities and 
PSNI.   
While predating the current all-party support for policing, Ellison and 
Mulcahy (2001) have noted that mainly Republican/Nationalist communities 
remained ‘satisfied’ with the police by virtue of their absence at a local level.  Though 
set within the contemporary context, more recent studies have evidence continuing 
dissociation between both Republican/Nationalist and Loyalist/Unionist communities 
– albeit grounded in perceptions of a poor policing service by PSNI rather than 
politics (Topping 2008a; 2008b; Byrne and Monaghan 2008; Topping and Byrne 
2012a).  Indeed, it is precisely within such communities where ‘shadow policing’ 
remains most active.  And while direct correlations between the quality of service by 
PSNI, post-conflict politics and community reliance upon alternative policing cannot 
readily be made, the evidence relating to a lack of policing by PSNI in such areas 
undoubtedly creates a dilemma for communities as to whether they should endure 
state-police deficits, or simply wait improvements, or enlist alternative forms of 
security provision despite their potential to damage the ‘public good’ of state policing 
(Dupont and Wood 2006:242).  This point was captured by a Republican respondent 
in a ‘hard-to-reach’ area, stating that: 
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‘to me, people are phoning us to deal with stuff rather than phoning the 
police…because we’ll find a way of dealing with it. Sometimes people don’t 
see the situation a child is in – they just see the crime and the consequences of 
it…it’s trying to find ways of dealing with it without punishment beatings, or 
dragging them through the courts…its local knowledge again’. 
 
 
Co-opting shadow policing? 
 
Having examined both the contextual and delivery aspects related to non-state 
security governance in Northern Ireland, the outstanding question of harnessing, or 
co-opting the latent ‘soft power’ extant across the country’s (mainly) working-class 
Loyalist and Republican communities remains (Vaughan 2007).  At a general level, 
the authors contend that security governance theory has been relatively 
underdeveloped on the issue of incorporating, in a practical sense, the operational 
capacities of alternative policing actors into an overarching state agendas or 
frameworks (Johnston and Shearing 2003; Martin 2012).  In Northern Ireland, this 
issue has been further complicated through political, paramilitary and state police 
actors who have monopolised the language and ownership surrounding policing and 
security more generally. The remainder this section will therefore seek to provide a 
more nuanced disaggregation of potential avenues for co-opting non-state security 
provision into practical policing considerations as a challenge to the limiting 
institutional police narratives which have dominated the post-ICP era (Loader 2000). 
 The centre of any such debate related to co-opting ‘shadow security’ 
capacities must begin with an acknowledgement of the ICPs original vision for 
developing a regulatory policing, rather than just police system in the country 
(Topping 2008b).  Here, Dupont (2006:107-8) clearly spells out that: 
‘the selective implementation of the…[ICP] recommendations which 
abandoned the broader security mandate in favour of more traditional forms of 
police supervision, makes clear the normative challenges posed by nodal 
regulation…old patterns represent a force of attraction which is hard to resist’ 
 
In addition to what may be observed as ‘path dependent’ reluctance to diversify 
policing beyond PSNI (Topping 2008b; Marnoch et al. 2013), this sentiment was 
captured by one community representative: 
if you’re going to talk about allowing it [community-based security 
governance] to exist and to use its strengths and to capitalise on its voice and 
to use it as a conduit – we have to accept the organic nature of it and accept 
the fact it is independent…’ 
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 The present research would also point to more subtle issues associated with 
co-opting ‘shadow policing’ provision and according such activities more than an 
‘unspoken’ policing role.  On a simple plain, the assimilation, or at least incorporation 
of organisations and actors into state-centric modes of operation retains the potential 
to transform community networks and relations into a different (and possibly 
diminished) set of relations by virtue of new, ‘alien’ forms of regulation and operating 
logics.  It is somewhat ironic that introducing PSNI into networks of security 
governance could actually destabilise community relations through the removal of 
local ‘ownership’ on local policing matters (Tonkiss and Passey 1999).  Thus, 
precisely how to render non-state contributions more accessible to the police and vice 
versa without damaging the vitality of local policing efforts is a fundamental issue to 
be negotiated on local terms rather than those set exclusively by the police or state.  
Although interestingly, the will for community groups to engage with formal state 
policing was apparent from interviews insofar as: 
‘policing can’t be left to the police.  And I mean, if a local community want to 
take steps, and real positive steps in order to address various issues in that 
area, I think it should be encouraged, but it should be done in co-operation 
with the police…’ (community respondent). 
 
 More broadly, co-opting non-state actors into programmes of joint action with 
PSNI must remain alert to the potential added value which may be derived above and 
beyond traditional police-centric attempts at community engagement (Brogden and 
Nijhar 2005).  Where this can be negotiated within acceptable parameters, there exists 
the potential (at least for PSNI) to engage not just a community of individuals, but to 
co-opt a whole spectrum of latent community capital (Dupont 2004).  The ancillary 
benefits of taping into these ‘moneyless economies’ not only recognises and 
reinforces the work already being done, but may further enable PSNI to gain access to 
services, knowledge and capital not otherwise available through the police-
institutional modes of working (Gilchrist 2004).  This was clearly articulated by one 
respondent who claimed that: 
‘cops need to take it [local security governing] seriously.  Because see 
anything that you want to know about [area], somebody from [named group] 
will tell you, and that’s who done what to who, when they did it, what they did 
it with and how they got away – and that’s what policing is about’. 
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 From the research, it was also clear that as part of co-opting non-state security 
auspices, consideration should also be given to the power which resides in these 
organisations to attract voluntary compliance within and between populations in terms 
of both ideological and operational ‘buy in’ to policing (Shearing 2006).  And while 
this has, to some extent, been informally developed between PSNI and community 
actors over the past decade (Jarman 2002; 2006; Topping & Byrne, 2012a), the 
question of formalising this approach for ‘normal’ crime and quality of life issues has 
yet to be fully answered.  This was succinctly captured by one group who indicated 
that: 
‘the community is only a meaningful concept if people are allowed to 
organise, associate and articulate collective views.  Which means…working 
through organisations.  So if you [PSNI] don’t trust or fund or support those 
organisations, and recognise what they are, you can’t deal with the 
community…’ 
 
 As a final proposition for co-opting ‘shadow policing’ into more formal (state) 
arrangements, the evidence would suggest that community-based policing provision 
also has the ability to ‘level’ the asymmetrical landscape of security and policing 
provision more generally (Stenson, 2005). As part of Braithwaite’s contention that 
security for the ‘poor’ (or marginal) is the best hope of security for the ‘rich’ within 
inequitable societies such as Northern Ireland (2000:231), it was suggested by one 
community worker that security governance is: 
‘a long term project.  In the short term, it’s all the stuff [crime issues] we’re 
dealing with now…This is for a safer, better, stronger community, people 
representing and supporting each other…this is the future – strong residents’ 
groups, people giving leadership, providing a voice for those that are 
vulnerable’. 
 
 Ultimately, the state of security through the varying combinations of state and 
‘shadow policing’ contribute to the relatively low-crime state status enjoyed by 
Northern Ireland as a whole (Department of Justice 2012).  In this regard, the 
‘security’ aspect of non-state security governance can more robustly be defended as a 
tangible output set within the country’s policing landscape.  However, it is the 
‘governance’ (or co-opting) aspect of security governance which, on the basis of the 







In summary, the evidence presented in this paper points to what is a complex picture 
of ‘shadow policing’, both in terms of conceiving and delivering policing outside the 
state; and the relations between community-based auspices of security and 
(potentially) the state policing apparatus.  In many respects, such complexity defies 
placing the activities of these security others into predefined categories or models of 
operation – but only where the generation of policing and security is viewed from a 
central, police-institutional lens.  Thus, the current paper has attempted to provide a 
more nuanced understanding of policing and security across Northern Ireland’s 
Loyalist and Republican communities from the perspective of the locale, the difficult 
translation of which into more formal policing language should not presuppose 
viability or legitimacy. 
 In part, and outside the limiting parameters of police-institutional reform in 
the country, there may actually be some ‘softening’ of governmental attitudes to co-
opting our non-state actors.  With the Criminal Justice Review (CJR) of 2000 having 
excluded schemes involved in community-based security governing by virtue of being 
peripheral to the formal criminal justice apparatus (CJR 2000: para.9.57), over a 
decade on the Department of Justice’s (DoJ) most recent community safety strategy 
has provided space to explore the role of community-based contributions to the 
community safety initiatives (DoJ 2012).  Yet in spite of the extensive (and in many 
cases vital) role of ‘shadow policing’ as part of the security landscape, to merely 
‘explore’ such contributions is symptomatic of a general sentiment by non-state actors 
‘that their role in addressing community safety issues had gone un-noticed or 
unrecognised by statutory organisations, at least at an official level of discourse’ 
(Topping and Byrne 2012a:63). 
 Across both Loyalist and Republican communities, it is also clear that non-
state security governance in the country occupies a significant ‘space’, or 
‘foundational presence’ from which other community freedoms and organising flow.  
In view of the evidence, a relevant course of inquiry at a theoretical and practical 
level – and especially for areas with conflicted policing arrangements – might be to 
move beyond security as we currently understand it in police-organisational sense; 
and look at the freedoms non-state security governance helps generate in terms of 
education, health and welfare and consider the extent to which ‘shadow policing’ 
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contributes to these ‘democratic goods’ rather than generating ‘security goods’ in 
isolation (Loader and Walker 2006).  Indeed, this has significant implications as part 
of facilitating latent community ‘soft power’ as a means through which to persuade 
and influence populations at the bottom of the social, economic, educational and 
health hierarchies, as well as improve their quality of life (Walklate 2003).   
But as the paper has argued, is ultimately those non-state organisations on the 
ground within working-class Loyalist and Republican communities who act as the 
guardians of unseen community capital, resilience and safety – the absence of which 
would render those communities and areas more destabilised than if security and 
policing was delivered solely by PSNI, regardless of moral, political or policy 
arguments to the contrary.  The issue therefore lies not necessarily with the auspices 
of ‘shadow policing’ themselves, but with the state-institutional capacity to accept 
that Northern Ireland’s buoyant, post-conflict society would be less safe and secure 
without them (Nolan 2012).  In attempting to capture ‘shadow policing’ as a ‘trait’ of 
Northern Ireland’s post-conflict society, the current status quo may be observed 
through the lens of one community representative, who simply noted: 
‘I think it’s just madness – here you’ve got vibrant communities…yet we [as a 
society] don’t see the potential in using those people, using those people to 
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